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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTINGHOUSE CREDIT I 
CORPORATION, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( £ a s e N 0 t 
vs. / 13533 
HYDROSWIFT CORPORATION, V 
Defendant and Appellant, I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action commenced by the Plaintiff to re-
cover Judgment under a written guaranty agreement 
executed by the defendant which guaranteed the pay 
ment of the floor planning account of a boat dealer 
purchasing boats from the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
and the entry of a judgment in favor of the Defendant 
of no cause of action, or that failing, a new trial. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
The Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of financing the purchase by trust receipts and 
floor planning of various commodities by retailers. 
The Defendant is engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of boats, the sales being to retail dealers and out-
lets. 
In early 1972, a retail dealer of the Defendant by 
the name of L& S Boats, Great Falls, Montana, desired 
to purchase boats from the Defendant for retail sale 
and to finance them under a floor plan account. The 
Plaintiff did not service the Great Falls, Montana, 
area. However, at the request of the Defendant and 
upon its agreement to guaranty the account (Exhibit 
1-P), the Plaintiff entered into a financing contract 
with L & S Boats (Exhibit 4-P). L & S Boats purchased 
the boats it desired from the Defendant and when the 
Defendant shipped them the Defendant invoiced the 
Plaintiff for payment (Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, 8-P and 
R 46 L 19-25). The boats were to be held in trust as 
security and upon sale the trust amount was to be re-
mitted to the Plaintiff. These agrements were entered 
into in March, 1972. Roy S. Ludlow was the President 
of the Defendant (R 43 L 25) and executed the written 
guaranty on behalf of the Defendant (R 45 L 12-14). 
It was further agreed by the Plaintiff and Defendant 
that monthly floor checks of the inventory of L & S 
Boats would be conducted by a retail credit company 
in the Great Falls, Montana, area, at the expense of 
L & S Boats and in addition the Defendant would make 
such a floor check each ninety (90) days. The limita-
tion on credit to L & S Boats was $25,000.00. 
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Contrary to the Appellants statement of facts, L & 
S Boats sold boats for some months and remitted the 
trust amount to the Plaintiff (R 70 L 19-24). However, 
on or about December 20, 1972, the Plaintiff was ad-
vised by the retail credit company that a floor check 
showed L & S Boats was out of trust for two (2) boats 
and two (2) trailers, totaling $4,255.37 and was not 
able to make payment. The Plaintiff immediately noti-
fied Roy S. Ludlow, President of the Defendant, by 
telephone, and made demand upon the Defendant for 
payment of the balance owing on the L & S Boat ac-
count in accordance with the unconditional guaranty. 
Plaintiff also made written demand for payment of the 
Defendant on December 27, 1972 (Exhibit 2-P) The 
Plaintiff offered to assign its security position to the 
Defendant upon receiving payment (R 5 L 14-29). 
The Defendant refused payment and requested that 
the Plaintiff pick up the remaining merchandise. The 
Plaintiff refused and renewed its demand under the 
unconditional guaranty and made repeated requests for 
payment during the months of January, February and 
March, 1973 (R 47 L 16-18). In the meantime L & S 
Boats disposed of the remaining merchandise. 
The Plaintiff, through its district manager, Norman 
Kent Moyes, offered testimony that a financing state-
ment and UCC Form 1 were filed with the State of 
Montana (R 56 L 1-3, R 80, 81). No contrary evidence 
was introduced. 
At the time of trial, the Plaintiff maintained that 
the Defendant had an unequivocal duty to make pay-
ment under the unconditional guaranty. The Defendant 
defended the action on the grounds the Plaintiff had 
the duty to first repossess the unsold merchandise still 
3 
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in trust; further the unconditional guaranty was null 
and void as not being the legal act of the Defendant 
corporation and the Plaintiff failed to perfect its secur-
ity agreement. The Trial Court resolved the issues in 
favor of the Plaintiff and granted the Plaintiff judg-
ment, which is being appealed by the Defendant. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
D E F E N D A N T S G U A R A N T Y W A S A VAL-
ID D O C U M E N T A N D W A S N O T VOIDED BY 
A N Y C O N D U C T O F T H E PLAINTIFF. 
The cogent provisions of the unconditional guar-
anty (Exhibit 1-P), on the reverse side, in the third 
paragraph, are as follows: 
"Until the indebtedness is fully paid, the 
guarantor waives all notices and formalities, all 
debtor relief protection, all rights to interpose 
defenses of the obligor, and all subrogation to 
collateral. The creditor shall have unlimited 
freedom to deal with the obligor and others con-
cerning the indebtedness and collateral without 
reducing guarantor's liability* The creditor has 
no duty to enforce the creditor's rights (1) 
against the obligor or others, (2) in any collat-
eral, or (3) under this guaranty, in any partic-
ular sequence or combination. • • •" 
In 38 Am Jud 2d 1116, Guaranty Section 110, it is 
stated: 
"The nature of the guarantor's promise con-
trols the need for the creditor to pursue the debt-
or or his property before commencing an action 
against the guarantor. Where the contract 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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promise of the guarantor is absolute—that is, 
subject to no condition except the default of the 
principal debtor—or where the promise has be-
come absolute by the occurrence of the named 
conditions, the guarantor is obligated to pay the 
debt of the principal debtor. In such a situation, 
the creditor may maintain an action against the 
guarantor immediately upon default of the debt-
or, without demand upon the debtor for pay-
ment and without first having proceeded against 
the debtor. The creditor need not show that an 
action against the debtor would be unavailing 
because of the latter's insolvency. The question 
as to whether the debt or any part thereof is col-
lectible from the debtor does not affect the lia-
bility of the guarantor, the latter being uncondi-
tionally bound to satisfy the obligation. Further, 
if the guaranty is absolute, the creditor need not 
pursue any claim which he might have against 
the debtor's property before proceeding against 
the guarantor/' 
Even a cursory examination of the wording of the 
guaranty readily discloses that it is unconditional and 
absolute. There are no conditions precedent for action 
on the part of the Plaintiff before the Defendant be-
comes legally obligated to make payment other than a 
notice of default and demand for payment. Wal l v. 
Eccles, 61 Utah 247, 211 P. 702, 145 A.L.R. 924. 
The references on page 5 of the Defendants Brief 
to Suretyship and its legal argument based upon them 
are not applicable to the instant case. No fraud was 
present, the Plaintiff released no property rights or 
security interests and was entitled to immediate pay-
ment under the terms of the unconditional guaranty. 
The Plaintiff offered to immediately assign its security 
interest and position to the Defendant upon receiving 
payment. The Plaintiff was under no duty whatsoever 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to first proceed against the trust property or L & S 
Boats. 
Neither is the Defendant's reference to the Uniform 
Commercial Code applicable and none of its provisions 
change the Plaintiff's rights under the unconditional 
guaranty. The Defendant specifically refers to 70A-3" 
606, UCC, dealing with commercial paper and speci-
fically releases, agreements not to sue and impairment 
of collateral, has no application in the instant case. The 
Defendant mistakenly concluded it had the right to 
withhold payment until the Plaintiff picked up the trust 
merchandise and must now bear its own loss resulting 
from such erroneous conclusion. 
The Defendant, in closing its argument under this 
point, claims the Plaintiff failed to perfect its security 
interest. The Defendant introduced no evidence that a 
security interest had not been perfected and the testi-
mony of the Plaintiff was to the effect a UCC Form 1 
blanket filing had been made in the State of Montana. 
The Trial Court was correct in its conclusion that such 
was the case. However, it would seem moot whether a 
security interest was perfected or not since the Defend-
ant refused to make payment, received no assignment 
of the Plaintiff's position nor made any attempt to exer-
cise the rights of the security holder. 
P O I N T II 
PLAINTIFF P R O V E D T H E G U A R A N T Y 
W A S VALID A N D T H E OFFICIAL A C T O F 
T H E D E F E N D A N T A N D T H E C O U R T DID 
N O T ERR IN G R A N T I N G J U D G M E N T IN 
F A V O R O F T H E PLAINTIFF BASED O N T H E 
GUARANTY. 
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Roy S. Ludlow, the signator for the Defendant on 
the unconditional guaranty (Exhibit 1-P)> testified he 
was the President of the Defendant (R 43 L 25) and 
that he signed on behalf of the Defendant corporation 
(R 45 L 8-14). This is consistent with his signature 
following the typed name and address of the Defend-
ant corporation. At no time during his testimony did 
Roy S. Ludlow deny his authority to sign for and on 
behalf of and to legally bind the Defendant. Further, 
no evidence whatsoever was introduced by the Defend-
ant that its President had no authority to execute the 
unconditional guaranty. Therefore, the execution of 
the document and the testimony of its President stands 
and the document remains as the uncontroverted act 
and contract of the Defendant, binding it to all of the 
terms of the unconditional guaranty. 
Furthermore, the Defendant, having been advised 
that credit would be extended L & S Boats only upon 
a written guaranty and having executed and delivered 
the same and having sold and shipped boats to L & S 
Boats and billed the Plaintiff and having received pay-
ment would be estopped from now contending that the 
guaranty lacked proper corporate authority. 19 Am 
Jur 2d 451, Corporations Section 974. Union Trust 
Co. v Illinois Midland R. Co. 117 US 434, 29 L ed 963, 
6 S Ct 809; 809; Long v Georgia P. R. Co. 91 Ala 519, 
8 So 706; Dillon V Myers, 58 Colo 492, 146 P 268; 
Marshall v Webster, 287 Ky 692, 155 SW2d 13; 
Shoemaker v Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 31 Md 396; Ben-
son Lumber Co v Thornton, 185 Minn 230, 240 N W 
651, 81 ALR 981; Whitney Arms Co. v Barlow. 63 
N Y 62; Williston v Ludowese, 53 N D 797, 208 N W 
82; Crowder State Bank v Aetna Power Co. 41 Okla 
394, 138 P 392; Dexter v First Guaranty State Bank 
(Tex Civ App) 180 S W 1172; Creditor's Claim & 
7 
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Adjustment Co. v Northwest Loan & T. Co. 81 Wash 
247, 142 P 670. 
The authorities quoted by the Defendant on pages 
10 and 11 of its Brief all relate to situations where the 
corporation has denied its authority to execute the doc-
ument. No such denial was made in the instant case 
and such authorities are therefore not in point. 
Also, the failure of the Defendant to furnish a 
certified copy of a board resolution or by-law, although 
desirable, does not void the unconditional guaranty 
and particularly so where the parties treated the same 
as a valid and binding document. The Trial Court 
properly found that the guaranty was executed by the 
Defendant, through its President, Roy S. Ludlow, and 
based upon the President's testimony the guaranty was 
properly executed on behalf of the Defendant corpor-
ation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court properly resolved the issues in the Plaintiff's 
favor and did not err in any of the particulars claimed 
by the Defendant. 
The Defendant's appeal should be dismissed and 
the Plaintiff awarded his costs of Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul M. Halliday of 
HALLIDAY & HALLIDAY 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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